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Serious students of farm policy (even those who have had a hand in the formation and 
maintenance of current farm policy) now agree that policy reform to end the agricultural sector’s 
longstanding reliance on traditional farm commodity programs is long overdue (e.g. Cochrane 
and Runge, 1992).  Although there has been some progress toward this goal, it is unclear exactly 
how rapidly the substantial inertia surrounding current policy can be overcome, or exactly what 
form new policy initiatives will take. To many it seems obvious that policy reform must account 
for the increasing heterogeneity of the agricultural sector, particularly with respect to the variety 
of dimensions by which farm households and firms now differ (Kuhn and Offutt, 1999). From 
this perspective, farm policy might be reshaped to provide a safety net based on the economic 
circumstances of the farm household (Gundersen et al., 2000). Others make the case that a new 
policy paradigm must recognize explicitly the “multifunctional” nature of agriculture. In this 
event, the managers of land and natural resources would be remunerated for the non-commodity 
outputs valued by society, but penalized for those that impose social costs (Blandford and 
Boisvert, 2002).  
 
 The outcome of new policy initiatives is likely to reflect both of these views and others 
in some politically acceptable combination.
1 In anticipating the data requirements for effective 
policy evaluation, they must at a minimum be sufficient to measure: 
 
   the effects of current agricultural policies/changes in policies on the behavior and 
well-being of farm households;  
 
   the environmental implications of traditional agricultural policies, and the impacts of 
policies directed towards environmental outcomes; and  
 
   the implications of changes in general economic conditions (e.g., due to technological 
change and shifts in consumer demand) for farm household behavior and well being.  
 
Since the effects of domestic farm policy reform in many developed nations will likely resonate 
through international markets for agricultural products and have implications for global 
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1 While acknowledging that the level of support for particular policy objectives can differ, a recent AAEA Data Task 
Force lists five national policy priorities relating to agriculture and rural America. They include: “(1) achieving 
national and global food security; (2) improving domestic productivity and international trade, especially in the 
production of food and fiber; (3) preserving and improving good health and human capital through improved 
nutrition; (4) preserving environmental and natural resources; and (5) sustaining viable rural lifestyles and rural 
sectors” (AAEA, 1997). 
  1environmental goals, it is imperative that countries can agree on the common data needed to 
effect international comparisons.  
 
The overriding theme of this conference is to raise the awareness of the data needed to 
effect an evaluation of new policy initiatives from these diverse perspectives. To contribute to 
this goal, the purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual overview of how we can analyze 
these issues at the farm household level, and then articulate the implications of this framework 
for the data that must be collected. To the extent possible, the conceptual framework should be 
generic—capable of encompassing a broard range of effects stemming from a variety of possible 
policy directions.
 2  We might be able to visualize an ideal data set for this purpose, but if 
international comparisons are to be effected, our recommendations must be guided by 
considerable restraint, recognizing countries’ differential capacities for assembling data, 
conceptual problems of measurement due to differences in social institutions, and realistic 
budgetary considerations. These issues should generate lively discussion throughout the 
conference.  
 
In what follows, I begin with a brief review of agricultural economists’ concerns over the 
adequacy of data that were evident more than a quarter century ago, particularly as they relate to 
farm households and rural economies more generally. Next, I describe briefly efforts in the 
United States by the USDA to collect farm household data on a continuing basis. Then, a 
framework by which these data can be used to inform the debate over new directions for farm 
policy is outlined, and the implications for data collection are articulated. A final section draws 
some conclusions for policy and poses some questions for more in-depth discussion throughout 
the conference.   
 
Some Background on the State of Agricultural Data Systems 
  In a review commissioned by the American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA) 
over a quarter century ago, one former Administrator of the Economic Research Service (ERS) 
of the USDA wrote: “It would be hard to imagine the subject of agricultural economics without 
data” (Upchurch, 1977, p. 305). By lending substance to description, and when properly ordered,  
data can reveal problems and point to their solution.  
 
No applied economist is ever confronted with an ideal set of data, but those engaged in 
the study of problems in agricultural economics, both public and private, arguably have had 
ready access to a storehouse of data unparalleled for any single sector of an economy. Beginning 
with the Census of Agriculture of 1839 and following the creation of USDA in 1862, steady 
improvements were made in the coverage, scope, and accuracy of U. S. agricultural data through 
the early 20
th Century. The capacity for further improvement was given a substantial boost 
during the 1920’s and ‘30’s with the creation of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Demand 
for better data came from all quarters during this period as economists and policy makers sought 
solutions to the deep-seated economic problems brought about by an extended period of 
seriously depressed agricultural prices (Upchurch, 1977, p. 305). It was also against this 
                                                 
2 Because of public demands for accountability in agricultural research from economic, environmental, and health 
perspectives, Antle and Wagenet (1995) argue persuasively for the need for collaboration across the full spectrum of 
biological, physical, and social sciences in setting research priorities and addressing the impacts of agricultural 
technology. Major changes in agricultural policy could hardy be judged by any lesser standard.  
  2backdrop of common problems facing a homogeneous agricultural sector in financial crisis that 
the foundations of present-day domestic agricultural policy were laid.    
 
Agricultural economists have continued to demand better data, and throughout the 
ensuing three or four decades, improvements were made both in the quality and coverage of 
many types of data (Upchurch, 1977). Table 1 contains a list of the general categories of data 
available at that point in time.  
 
It was not until the mid-1970’s that agricultural economists began to raise some serious 
questions about data. A new research agenda was beginning to emerge to address the issues 
facing an agricultural industry forever changed through the adoption of technology, decisions in 
response to public policy, and the expansion of international markets. This clearly heightened the 
demand for data to measure a broader range of social and economic phenomena in agriculture 
and in rural areas. As consolidation and specialization in farming continued, data were also 
required for the rapidly expanding agribusiness industries both up-stream and down-stream from 
farming operations.  
 
Much of the data used in agricultural economics research continues to be collected and 
reported by public agencies, particularly the USDA through its Economic Research Service and 
the National Agricultural Statistical Service (NAAS). There has also been tremendous growth in 
the data acquired through special surveys or studies, and other data are increasingly available 
through private sources such as commodity associations, private consultants, and Extension 
services (Just et al., 2002). Some special research efforts were to study issues that had heretofore 
not been identified, or that were anticipated to emerge in the future. Only when it becomes clear 
that an issue will persist for some period of time is it prudent to put in place procedures for the 
systematic collection and reporting of new data. Important examples include the more systematic 
maintenance of data on purchased nutrient and chemical inputs and energy use in response to a 
greater recognition of agro-environmental problems, fuel shortages, and higher fuel prices in the 
late 1970’s.  
 
But progress both in the quality of data and its coverage has also been uneven. For the 
study of some issues, data have never been adequate. In other cases, data have proven sufficient 
in the past, but the data systems may now be obsolete, or are in danger of becoming so.
3  
 
Despite the increasing interconnection between farm and non-farm rural economies, for 
example, efforts as of the mid-1970’s to secure the data needed to study the broad range of rural 
economic problems had fallen well short of those to collect and maintain agricultural data 
(Bryant, 1977). Despite the mounting evidence since then that many farm families rely 
                                                 
3 According to Bonnen (1977) conceptual obsolescence “…can occur not only because of changes in the 
organization and nature of the food and fiber industry, …, but also because the agenda of food and fiber policy 
(public and private) changes dramatically” (p. 388). When this happens, of course, the questions asked of the data 
change as well. As we move further into this electronic information age, there is also greater risk of obsolescence of 
a different kind if sufficient attention is not given to the packaging, dissemination, and accessibility of data to a 
variety of users. This issue was underscored in the report of the most recent AAEA (1997) data task force, 
particularly as it relates to availability of micro-level data. 
  3increasingly on off-farm income, there has been no sustained effort to develop a data base to 
investigate the complexity and dynamics of these rural livelihood strategies.
4    
 
Bryant attributed the unevenness in data collection largely to the fact that the demand for 
agricultural data had historically been at the national and international levels. It was easy for the 
industry to lobby in favor of better data that could not only serve private interests, but also 
provide the foundation for the study of commodity farm policy. In contrast, the demand for rural 
economic data is primarily at the state and local level. There has been no effective lobby for rural 
economic data; these data are perhaps still often viewed as just part of the economic data for the 
larger economy that crosses all industries, regions, and people.  
 
These difficult circumstances are continually compounded because “rural development” 
means different things to different groups. To some, rural development means jobs; to others it is 
access to services or a change in social institutions. Thus, as suggested by Upchurch (1977) in an 
earlier critique of rural data systems, we have failed to conceptualize rural socio-economic 
problems adequately,
5 and then match this effort with equal concern to design statistical systems 
to measure important social phenomena. Federal budgetary problems that plagued the 1970’s and 
‘80’s and persist today have also worked against efforts to obtain rural economic data on a 
consistent and sustained basis.    
 
This is not to say that the call for changes in our agricultural data systems has gone 
completely unheeded. In accordance with the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 and subsequent 
legislation, the USDA now reports annually to the U. S. Congress on the status of family farms 
(Sommers, et al., 1998). Until the mid-1980s, the data in this report to Congress were collected 
as part of the USDA’s farm costs and returns survey (FCRS). In the mid-1980’s, the Agricultural 
Resource Management Study (ARMS) replaced the FCRS as the basis for this annual report. 
ARMS is a flexible tool for data collection that was clearly developed in order to expand the 
scope for analysis and respond to emerging policy concerns, such as those related to the farm 
sector’s greater reliance on off-farm income.
6 It is perhaps also the appropriate vehicle to collect 
some additional farm level data needed for an analysis of policies designed to recognize 
explicitly the environmental and other non-commodity outputs from a multifunctional 
agriculture. 
  
A summary of the categories of information collected as part of the ARMS survey is in 
Table 2. Many of the sections assemble information on costs and returns of the farm business, as 
well as on land holding and other farm assets. To place the farm business into a broader context 
with the farm household, the information collected under Section K was added to the old costs 
and returns survey. The questions generally relate to the extent and type of off-farm employment, 
                                                 
4 On occasion, there have been some special studies to understand the nature of the participation of farm operations 
and farm family members in off-farm employment. See, for example, Gould and Saupe (1989) for an analysis from 
such a special survey.   
5 At that time, Upchurch (1977) pointed to a report of the AAEA Committee on Economic Statistics, which argued 
that the most critical needs were: better concepts of demographics; better measures of social well-being, whether in 
health, education, personal safety, housing, income and employment; income and asset distribution in rural areas; 
regional and local area development data; and data systems to do program evaluation. 
6 The ARMS survey form is modified from time to time for the purpose of collecting information about a special 
topic or policy concern.  
  4the reasons of working off-farm, off-farm earnings, non-farm assets, and aggregate household 
consumption expenditures. Data are collected for both the farm operator and spouse.  
The section on other farm income, including the variety of government program 
payments helps to complete the picture (Table 2). Items in this section, such as revenue for 
custom work, livestock grazing, and recreational services, can clearly be important components 
of farm family income, as are de-coupled production flexibility contract payments. In theory, 
these de-coupled payments should have no effect on farm production. Currently, the most 
important, environmentally-related programs make annual payments to farmers for land taken 
out of production and put into trees, filter strips or other conservation practices. The government 
also pays some share of the establishment costs for the individual conservation practices. These 
payments contribute to farm family income, but in contrast to the de-coupled payments, they are 
designed to affect production plans and are supposed to lead to land use changes that enhance the 
environment. No data are collected in ARMS to document the contribution of these program 
payments to important environmental goals. We return to this issue below. 
 
These efforts in the United States and similar efforts elsewhere are a significant step 
forward in gathering improved farm household data for the analysis of critical issues as 
legislators and policy makers in developed countries redirect the focus of domestic agricultural 
policy. But it is only the beginning.
7  Rather than repeat the errors of the past, the adequacy of 
these data for expanded policy analysis can only be assessed within an appropriate framework to 
conceptualize rural socio-economic problems. The nature of this framework turns not only on 
and the interrelationship between farm households and the greater rural economies, but also on 
the types of policy changes anticipated in the near future.  
 
I proceed in a series of steps. First, and perhaps foremost, this framework must inform 
policy makers of the implications in policy changes for the income distribution of farm 
households. Next, the framework is expanded to embrace the effects of policy redirections that 
recognize the multifunctionality of agriculture and compensate farmers more directly for their 
production of valuable non-commodity outputs or penalize them for the production of non-
commodity outputs that impose costs on society. Finally, it is important to put these data needs 
into perspective with budget considerations, the needs of various users of the data, the form of 
data collection and distribution, and the potential need to link household and physical resource 
data through some GIS capacity.  
 
A Framework for Understanding the Generation of Income by Farm Households and its 
Distribution 
  In developing this conceptual framework, we must understand how income is generated 
and its distribution between farm and non-farm households and among groups of farm 
households. We can distinguish two separate, but very much interrelated processes. The first 
                                                 
7 Although the viability of rural areas is listed as one of the five national policy priorities listed by the most recent 
AAEA Data Task Force, just the tone of their final report, at least to this reader, would suggest any effective lobby 
for rural economic data is still absent. However, the heightened level of prominence given to resource and 
environmental concerns in the policy debate will require a much sharper focus on the spatial diversity of policy 
impacts, be they site-specific, local, area-specific, regional, or nationally differentiated. Those with a long standing 
interest in broader rural economic data may have found a significant ally also with a heightened demand for rural 
micro-economic data.      
  5relates to how the income in generated initially. That is, the productive activity of any firm or 
sector of an economy generates sales revenue, as well as a stream of payments to various factors 
of production—intermediate inputs and several primary factors such as land, capital and labor. 
Our focus is on the total payments to these primary factors, which constitutes most of value 
added in the economy.  
 
The distribution of total value added among land, labor and capital is sometimes called 
the functional distribution of income.
8  The proportions of total payments going to land, labor, 
and capital characterize the relative input intensities of the various economic sectors. This 
distribution clearly depends on the amount of each factor employed by sector and the wage rate 
relative to returns to land and capital. But the story doesn’t end there; these payments to primary 
factors are in turn distributed geographically and among households in various income groups, 
depending on location of both the economic activity and the ownership of the productive factors. 
The final incidence of these primary factor payments to various household and income groups is 
often called the size distribution of income.  
 
An Economy Wide View 
  We can gain an important perspective on the relationship between these two concepts of 
the distribution of income through a social accounting matrix (SAM). The SAM, whose 
development is attributed to Richard Stone, explicitly includes institutions and their interactions 
into a general accounting framework (Miller et al., 1989). It has at its foundations the inter-
industry transactions table (e.g. an I-O table) first used by Leontief over 60 years ago to 
characterize the structure of an economy.  
 
One objective of a SAM is to organize information about the economic and social 
structure of an economy in a particular year. It is nothing more than a double entry booking 
system, where for each of a series of accounts, the incomings and outgoings (or income and 
expenditures in most cases) must balance. In this respect, the SAM resembles traditional national 
accounts, but embodies much more (King, 1985).  
 
Perhaps the best way to understand a SAM is through an example with numbers. With the 
help of the hypothetical SAM in Table 3, we can establish the linkage between the functional and 
size distributions of income at this aggregate level. This SAM depicts the standard set of inter-
industry accounts for a three sector economy, but also distributes primary factor payments (for 
two types of labor, capital, and land) among urban (URBAN), rural non-farm (RNFARM), and 
rural-farm (RFARM) residents and between low (Low) and high (High) income households.
9    
 
By convention, the individual elements of the SAM represent expenditures or 
distributions of funds from the sector in the column to the sector in the row. For example, the 
manufacturing sector purchases $5,052 of intermediate inputs from the agricultural sector, while 
                                                 
8 The importance to farm-household well being of such things as consumption, environmental quality, and farm and 
non-farm assets is considered explicitly below.   
9 The three sectors are agriculture (AGR), manufacturing (Man) and services (Ser). The two types of labor (Lab1 
and Lab2) might represent unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. Capital (Cap) and Land are the other two 
primary factors of production. There are also rows and columns to trace government expenditures and receipts 
(Govt) and transactions to and from the rest of the world (ROW).  
  6low-income households purchase $133 of agricultural output for final consumption. The portions 
of the table surrounded by the boxes are typically what one sees in the national I-O accounts.   
 
To understand the income distribution (defined here as total payments to the four primary 
factors of production), we focus initially on the corresponding four rows of the table (e.g., total 
payments to Lab1 are $17,446, while total payments to Land are $322). Further, all land is 
employed in agriculture, but each of the three sectors employs some portion of the other three 
primary factors (e.g., manufacturing makes payments of $2,032 to Lab1).  
 
While it is often useful to know the proportion of payments to labor due to any 
productive sector, the functional distribution of income relates to how the total primary factor 
payments (value added) are distributed among its four components. Total value added in this 
economy is $42,946 (e.g. 17446 + 9286 + 15892 + 322),
10 and the factor shares distributed to 
Lab1, Lab2, Cap, and Land, respectively, are 41%, 22%, 37%, and 1%.
11 From this exercise, it is 
clear that as long as the components of value added are reported individually (which by the way 
is not often the case), the national income accounts provide at any point in time a detailed 
snapshot of the functional distribution of income.  
 
What distinguishes the SAM from the national I-O accounts is that total value added in 
the economy is additionally distributed to households in different income classes. And, this is the 
essence of the size distribution of income. In this example, there are two dimensions to this 
distribution—the distribution by location, and by income class.  
 
To illustrate, of the $17,446 payments to Lab1, we see from Table 3 that $10,690 (or 
61%) are paid to households in urban areas. From Table 4, we see that less than 1% goes to rural 
farm households, 28% goes to rural non-farm households, and 11% is paid to the government. In 
this economy, 75% of the payments to land go to rural farm households, while 9% go to urban 
households and 16% is paid to the government.  
 
Nearly 29% of all value added in this economy ($12,339) is paid to the government, 
while the remaining $30,608 is distributed among low and high-income households in the rural 
and urban areas. Urban households receive nearly 2/3’s of this amount, while rural non-farm 
households receive over 31%. The $481 going to rural farm households is less than 1% of the 
total. As seen in Table 4, high-income households receive 57%, 63%, and 64% of the income 
going to urban, rural farm, and rural non-farm households, respectively.  
 
The data over and above that found in traditional national accounts needed to populate 
the cells of a SAM are substantial indeed, but once the data have been organized, they present a 
powerful image that can reveal a great deal about the country’s economic structure. We must be 
ever mindful, however, that this image is only a static, descriptive “snapshot” at a point in time. 
                                                 
10 The lion’s share of payments to any component of value added comes from one of the three production sectors, 
but, there are also $106 and $56 payments to Lab1 and Lab2, respectively, from the rest of the world. 
11 We can likewise examine a similar functional distribution by production sector. That is, of the $11,949 of total 
value added in agriculture (e.g. 1646 + 3789 + 6192 + 322), 14%, 32%, 52%, and 3% are paid to Lab1, Lab2, Cap, 
and Land, respectively. Similar calculations could be made for manufacturing and services as well.        
 
  7A comparison of SAMs at two different points in time would embody the combined effects of 
general changes in the economy and policy interventions, but with little insight into the process 
through which the changes were effected. If major changes in farm policy were set in place in the 
intervening years, for example, the functional distribution of income may change, but so also 
might the distributive shares (e.g. Table 4) that characterize the size distribution of income.  
 
A SAM does provide the statistical basis for the creation of a model of the economy that 
can be used to simulate the effects of policy interventions (King, 1986), most often through 
either SAM multiplier analysis or the construction of a Computable General Equilibrium Model. 
In manipulating these models, it is usually assumed that policy interventions have no effect on 
the distributional coefficients in the model. As we contemplate major revisions in farm policy in 
response to changed policy priorities, our singularly most important task is perhaps to discover 
how these distributional coefficients are likely to be altered.  
 
For that purpose alone, we need access to comprehensive micro data about farm and non-
farm activities of farm households. Only by bringing these data to micro-economic models that 
recognize the important interactions between farm and non-farm activities in these households, 
can we learn about how farm-households respond to new policy initiatives and how the income 
distribution changes in the process. As echoed by the recent AAEA Data Task Force, the 
complex processes of technology adoption, off-farm job participation, and participation in 
environmental programs can be understood only by appealing to these same micro-economic 
foundations (AAEA, 1997). As a by-product, such micro-level analyses may provide the basis 
for populating the cells of regional or national SAMs that document the size distribution of 
income in rural areas.      
 
The Micro-economics of the Farm Household (F-H) 
For many applied economists, the genesis of the agricultural household model lies in 
Becker’s early investigations into the economics of time allocation within and outside the 
household. This time allocation model is the conceptual cornerstone of the now vast literature on 
labor supply. In turn, development economists were quick to expand the model to include 
farming activities for the study of diverse livelihood strategies of subsistence farms which 
depend critically on the allocation of time among household activities, off-farm work, and farm 
labor (Singh et al., 1986). 
 
One curious fact in these further developments of Becker’s model for time allocation is 
the absence of any reference to the earlier recognition by agricultural economists of the 
importance of firm-household interrelationships, as is seen in Heady’s 1952 text entitled 
Economics of Agricultural Production and Resource Use. I mention Heady’s work not because I 
believe his contribution to our understanding of these interrelationships has gone unnoticed. 
Quite to the contrary, his careful treatment of this issue undoubtedly shaped the thinking of 
countless students who studied production economics from this landmark text. Rather, I mention 
his work not only to emphasize that agricultural economists have long recognized the 
significance of these interrelationships, but also to focus attention on how our views of the 
interrelationships have evolved. I can think of no better way to contrast how our demands for 
data to effect policy analysis have changed.  
 
  8The important ideas put forth on this subject by Heady a half-century ago can be 
summarized in the eight quotations found in Exhibit 1. Although some might quarrel with the 
emphasis and suggest subtle changes in wording, most would agree that these old ideas, in 
substantial measure, still ring true. The interdependence between the household and the firm 
remains strong if not intensified, and farm production and profits remain only intermediate ends 
rooted in more ultimate ends of family consumption and utility. But, it is perhaps in these subtle 
changes that we uncover the clues regarding the evolution of the farm-household 
interrelationships that affect our approach to farm policy analysis.  
 
So what are the differences? Most notable is the absence by Heady of any reference to 
off-farm work or other activity, but such an omission was substantially right for the times. In his 
view, family activities were critical to resource allocation, but any labor available in the 
household flowed only in one direction—into farming activities. One major source of conflict 
between the firm and the household was in the proportions of current income allocated between 
current consumption and re-investment in the farm business. Clearly, the net flow of funds was 
primarily in one direction—from the farm to the household. This simpler view of the farm-
household interaction is depicted in Figure 1, and the subtle, and not so subtle changes are traced 
schematically in Figures 2 and 3. Physical flows in the figures are represented by dashed lines, 
while financial flows are the solid lines. 
 
A F-H Model: The Subsistence Farm Perspective. Heady’s initial conception of F-H interactions 
was one in which primary factors and intermediate inputs were combined to produce agricultural 
commodities (Figure 1). Much of the farm labor was supplied by the household, and few 
intermediate inputs were purchased. Feed was home grown, and green manure was used to 
sustain soil texture and productivity.  
 
  Some commodities were sold, while others were consumed and contributed directly to 
household utility. Time was divided among farm labor, household tasks and leisure, the latter 
(what little there might be) contributing directly to utility.   
 
  Farm revenue is from sales of agricultural commodities, as well as commodity program 
payments. Any yearly revenue not spent on farm inputs (including farm investments in any year) 
goes to the household, where it contributes directly to utility through the purchase of goods and 
services. Any money paid to family labor also goes directly to household income, whereas 
unpaid family labor effectively reduces input costs below what they would have been if labor 
had to be hired. Any government payments for conservation or land retirement programs during 
that period of time are assumed to reduce input costs, or enhance the value of farm assets. 
Wealth, in the form of farm assets, contributes to household utility. 
 
  Absent any opportunities for off-farm work, any net flow of funds (small as they might 
be in some years) would be from the farm to the household. Thus, along with the decision on 
how much household labor was to be used on the farm, the other major farm-household decision 
was the distribution of net farm revenue between household consumption and farm investment.     
           
  
  9A F-H Model: Where There are Non-farm Opportunities. As farmers continued to adopt new 
technology and substitute capital and newly available purchased inputs to reduce costs, labor was 
released from agriculture. Much of the surplus labor left the rural areas, but as some rural areas 
prospered, in large measure due to the growth in an agribusiness industry to serve the needs of 
production agriculture (or through other rural development efforts), there were increased off-
farm employment opportunities for farm family members. As the industry continued to mature 
and consolidate, some farm households unable or unwilling to adopt technology and expand the 




                                                
This major change in the rural livelihood strategies of many farm families has led to more 
complex farm-household interactions (Figure 2). The most obvious are decisions about an 
additional use for the time of household members. Off-farm jobs contribute directly to household 
income, but for some at least, these jobs have led to an accumulation of non-farm assets, often 
facilitated by substantial job-related benefits such as health insurance and retirement programs. 
These assets and benefits either contribute directly to household utility as wealth, or augment the 
flow of current income to the household. With one exception, the other physical and money 
flows of the simpler model in Figure 1 remain, although the relative size of the flows along any 
path could be altered dramatically. The one exception is that the net flow of funds between the 
farm operation and the household can be in either direction.  
 
A F-H Model:With Non-farm Opportunities and a Multifunctional Agriculture. What sets the 
third, perhaps contemporary, view of the F-H model in Figure 3 apart is more about society’s 
explicit recognition of the value of agriculture’s multifunctional nature than it is about any 
change in farm and off-farm economic opportunities for farm households. In this model, farm 
households are assumed to value the multifunctional attributes as well, but perhaps differently 
from others in society.
12 Further, farm payments are assumed to be de-coupled from farm 
production, as depicted by the flow of funds directly from the government to the farm, rather 
than directly to the commodity outputs. 
 
  The multifunctional nature of agriculture is not new, but only recently has it been 
elevated to a place of prominence in the agricultural policy debate, along with the broadened 
range of other non-trade concerns including food security, food safety and quality, animal 
welfare and rural development. While the concept of multifunctionality appears to have various 
interpretations, the major intent is to characterize agricultural production as a multi-output 
activity for which there are important non-commodity outputs in the production processes. In 
addition to food, fiber, and agricultural raw materials, these multiple outputs may include 
landscape amenities and cultural heritage that yield “social’ benefits not traded in organized 
markets.
13 These non-market outputs have no price because an individual’s enjoyment 
(consumption) of the good does not reduce the quantity available to others, and it is not possible 
 
12 Some might argue that in earlier times farm families derived utility directly from their stewardship of the soil, 
rather than just indirectly through the effects of the value of farm assets as is now suggested in Figure 1. I wouldn’t 
disagree, and this omission above was for purposes of simplicity, and to draw sharp distinction between that 
situation and the policy implications from society’s growing recognition of the value of several important 
multifunctional non-commodity outputs.    
13 Some multifunctional outputs, such as those related to environmental quality, have enjoyed an elevated place of 
prominence on developed countries policy agendas for some time.  




  To recognize the social values of agriculture that are not traded in organized markets and 
comprehend the significance of this view for domestic and international policy, “we must devise 
a way to “level the playing field” in order to compare policies affecting the production of non-
commodity outputs with those affecting commodity outputs, even though it is difficult to value 
non-commodity outputs or to determine how inputs are combined in their production. We need 
not agree on every non-commodity output to include in a definition of multifunctionality. We 
must agree, however, not to list only those with social benefits; there are non-commodity outputs 
that impose social costs. It also matters little whether these social benefits or costs derive from an 
externality or the public good nature of the non-commodity outputs” (Blandford and Boisvert, 
2002, p. 9). 
 
Boisvert (2001a, b) accomplished this task by characterizing multifunctionality as joint 
production--a situation in which two or more outputs are technically interdependent (Shumway 
et al., 1984).
15 Originally, the definition of joint production focused only on commodity outputs 
– the classic definition refers to things that cannot be produced separately, but are joined by 
common origin or non-allocable input (e.g. wool and mutton from sheep, wheat and straw, or 
soybean meal and oil). There are two other important, but quite distinct conditions, that give rise 
to inter-linkages between products: when there are technical interdependencies in the production 
process; or when outputs compete for an (allocable) input that is fixed at the firm level. 
 
In leveling this policy playing field, it is critical to realize that a simple view of joint 
production in fixed proportions is unlikely to apply more generally in multifunctionality. Where 
outputs occur in other than fixed proportions, changes in the relative prices of both inputs and 
outputs will affect the supply of both commodity and non-commodity outputs in agriculture.  
 
Boisvert (2001a,b) has captured the critical aspects of joint production in a simple model 
with two commodity outputs and two non-commodity outputs – (e.g. a landscape amenity) and a 
negative externality (e.g., pollution). The environmental residual might be nitrate leaching; as 
one applies more fertilizer to a fixed land area, leaching would increase, as would output.  
However, if a fixed amount of fertilizer were applied to more land, output would rise, but 
leaching would fall because the fertilizer intensity of production would fall. In this case, 
pollution is not generated in fixed proportion with commodity output, but production is joint 
nonetheless. There is no way to disentangle or isolate the separate contribution of the purchased 
input to the production of the commodity and its effect on the resulting level of pollution. 
Landscape amenities are assumed to increase with land in agriculture, but as is often held to be 
the case, as the extent of land in agriculture increases, the smaller is the amenity value placed on 
an additional unit of agricultural land. Thus, the level of landscape amenities increases, but again 
not in the same proportion to commodity output. 
 
                                                 
14 These characteristics of public goods are non-rivalry and non-exclusivity. Unlike public goods, positive and 
negative externalities are divisible and can be depleted, but are also not priced. 
15 This discussion draws heavily on two technical annexes prepared by Boisvert (2001) as part of an OECD report 
entitled Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework. 
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seen in the financial flows from the government to the non-commodity outputs in Figure 3), the 
various commodity and non-commodity joint products, technically interrelated for one or more 
reasons, are revealed to be economically interdependent as well.
16 This in turn would facilitate a 
comparison of direct policy intervention to affect the levels of these non-commodity outputs with 
the indirect effects that come through traditional agricultural commodity policy. Not 
surprisingly, if we set the subsidy on amenities and the tax on pollution at their marginal social 
values, we obtain the welfare maximizing Pigouvian outcome for internalizing the external 
benefits and costs of the non-commodity outputs (Spulber, 1985). 
 
Implications for Data, Modeling, and Policy Analysis 
  The major point to underscore from these three figures is that the data and modeling 
capacity required for effective policy evaluation can be altered dramatically by changes in: the 
organization of farms, off-farm job opportunities, and the agenda of farm policy. 
 
Modeling Considerations 
In his early production economics text, Heady (1952) recognized that by embracing both 
the farm and the household, micro-economic analysis would be more complex, except under the 
most stylized conditions where the farm and the household could be treated separately, or 
perhaps more appropriately in a recursive fashion  (Exhibit 1).
17 This would mean that the profit 
maximizing outputs and input demands of the firm could be solved for initially, and this profit 
could then be used in the household model to solve for the utility maximizing consumption 
levels.  The sufficient conditions for which this is true are several: a) a single period model; b) 
farmers are price takers; c) complete markets exist for all inputs and outputs; and d) the 
household must not consume all its own output.
18 If these conditions do not hold, there will exist 
a virtual (or shadow) price for a commodity that will be endogenous to the firm—a function of 
both technology and preferences.  
 
The reality of the farm household, of course, is not this simple. The possibility for such 
an orderly recursive analysis are confounded once there is explicit recognition of: a) the tradeoff 
between current and future consumption; b) farmer’s risk averse behavior in the face of 
uncertainty, or c) any constraints on capital (Exhibit 1). The more complex approach is also 
required if one can’t observe multifunctional outputs directly. In this case it would not be 
possible to realize a Pigiouvian policy solution through direct taxes and subsidies on the non-
commodity outputs. Rather, incentives to move in the direction of socially optimal levels of the 
                                                 
16 Leathers (1991) relates the notion of joint production to cost and profit by appealing to the notion of economies of 
scope, which can be defined in a somewhat simplified manner for our purposes.  For any group of outputs, Y1,…, 
Ym, there are economies of scope if: C(Y1) + C(Y2) + C(Y3) + … + C(Ym) > C(Y1,…,Ym ). That is, if there are 
economies of scope, the cost of producing the m products jointly, C(Y1,…,Ym), is less than the cost of producing the 
products separately.   
17 In the basis farm-household model, the household utility function is maximized subject to a cash income 
constraint, a constraint on household time, and a production or technology constraint. These constraints are then 
often combined into one where household expenditures are set equal to Becker’s concept of a full income in which 
the value of the household’s stock of time is recorded plus a measure of farm profits. All labor and time are valued 
at the wage rate (Singh et al., 1986).  
18 These conditions were established by Strauss (1986) in rigorous mathematical terms, and as they mention by 
others some years earlier. 
  12multifunctional outputs might come indirectly through taxes or incentive payments to affect: a) 
inputs use; b) the use of a particular technology; or c) the adoption of a particular set of 
production practices.   
 
An Ideal Data Set? 
Under these more realistic conditions, one can easily be discouraged by the long list of 
data required to estimate the full farm household model. At a minimum one must have data for 
consumption expenditures, farm and off-farm labor supply, farm and non-farm outputs and 
inputs, assets, and prices for all goods, inputs, and labor. Information about the use of certain 
technologies and participation in government programs is also needed. Basic demographic 
characteristics are needed to account for the effects of differences in education, human capital 
and stages in the life cycle on production, consumption, and labor supply decisions. But, it is 
exactly the extent of the data that calls for a commitment at the national level for the collection 
and maintenance of a farm-household data base. It is at this level that appropriate sampling 
designs can exploit economies of scale in data gathering, ensure regional representation, and 
possibly exploit the advantages for analysis of a panel of time series cross sectional data on the 
same farm households.  
 
I have just come close to describing the ideal data set any agricultural economist might 
long for to effect agricultural policy analysis at the farm-household level. There are many 
developed countries today that now conduct separate household budget surveys and farm 
management surveys. Since data on both consumption and production activities are needed to 
estimate the complete farm-household model, one way to envision this ideal data set would be to 
have both surveys administered to the same households, or at least include some significant 
overlap.
19 The ARMS data constitute a significant step toward realizing this more ideal data 
base, in that information about household income and assets are added to the farm production 
data, but ARMS stops well short of a complete consumption or budget survey.  
 
I am not so naïve as to believe that all remaining gaps between ARMS and the ideal 
situation will be closed any time soon, even if there were a commitment to do so at the highest 
levels of government. Further, if one is concerned about documenting the effect of policy on the 
production of multifunctional outputs from agriculture, neither the standard farm management 
nor budget surveys assemble the required data.  
  
  Progress toward any ideal data base will remain incremental, but it is still possible to 
learn a great deal from incomplete data. This is hardly a revelation to applied economists. Many 
routinely conduct policy analysis by focusing only on the essential structural or reduced form 
equations,
20 by imposing separability, by appealing to the economics of duality, or by 
aggregating production or consumption activities. The conceptual underpinning of the complete 
                                                 
19 Not surprisingly this strategy would assemble a comprehensive list of indicators bearing a striking resemblance to 
what is now collected through the household questionnaire administered by the World Bank as part of its standard 
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) survey for developing countries. According to Deaton (1997), 
Ainsworth and Munoz (1986) provide an excellent description of the typical LSMS survey. 
20 Within the context of off-farm labor supply, Goodwin and Holt (2002, p. 188) provide a good discussion of the 
differences between structural and reduced form modeling in making the transition from a conceptual or theoretical 
model to empirical work.  
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analysis.  
 
Emerging Priorities for Policy Analysis 
The present challenge is to identify the most critical, additional pieces of data for the 
study of an evolving domestic policy agenda.  Clearly, we need basic data on off-farm income to 
document its significance relative to farm income in the well being of farm households. But to 
assess the important interplay between farm and household decisions as it is affected by changes 
in agricultural policy, we also need data about the household’s and the farm’s endowment of land 
and other natural resources.  A couple of examples can serve to illustrate these points. The first 
has to do with the increased price and income risk that most observers expected would have 
followed from the enactment of the budget-driven 1996 farm bill. The second is the elevated 
status of concerns for the environment and other non-commodity multifunctional outputs from 
agriculture.  
 
With its focus on shrinking the overall level of support for agriculture and on moving the 
industry toward free market status, the 1996 Farm Bill signaled the beginning of the end for 
several program provisions that for years have helped farmers manage risk. This Bill 
substantially reduced deficiency payments and acreage setasides, and other measures, such as 
price supports, commodity loans and loan guarantees, are scheduled to be phased out over a 
several-year period during which eligible farmers would receive risk-free transition payments. In 
return, farmers will then be free to produce whatever they want and compete in markets on their 
own merits (Barry, 1999).  
 
This particular experiment with farmers managing their own risk was short lived as the 
government pumped billions of dollars of extra financial assistance into the farm sector in 
response to the recent downturn in farm prices. In the longer term, Barry (1999) and I’m sure 
other experts in farm finance would agree, argues that one critical policy issue is to identify both 
gaps in the risk bearing capacity of farmers and an appropriate policy response if one is needed. 
Table 5 contains some 13 options that could be examined in a comprehensive assessment of risk 
management. In addition to the expected list of management strategies and financial measures, 
off-farm income is included. This is perhaps not surprising, and there has been for some time 
evidence that off-farm income does reduce farm household income inequality (e.g. Boisvert and 
Ranney, 1990; Findeis and Reddy, 1987; and Ahearn et al., 1985).  
 
Merely having this capacity to document the risk reduction effects of off-farm income is 
perhaps sufficient justification for collecting such data through ARMS, but I would argue that it 
also paves the way for much more systematic analysis of how farm households manage risk. The 
theory of risk aversion tells us straightaway that off-farm income is a viable candidate for a farm 
household’s portfolio of income generating activities along side a diversified set of production 
activities. What is also true, however, is that diversification into off-farm jobs may be to improve 
the efficiency of labor use on farms too small to employ all household labor efficiently due to 
land or capital constraints. By considering farm and off-farm work as the only two activities and 
land and labor as the only constraints, this interplay between the role of diversification and 
efficiency of resource use is easily seen graphically. One need only trace out in activity space the 
  14successive graphic solutions to the quadratic programming problem that generate the Mean-
Variance efficiency locus (e.g. re-label the graph on page 11 of How and Hazell, 1968).  
 
Just (1974) and Traill (1976) were among the first to include a measure of farm income 
variability in output supply equations. Any reduction in output due to risk would certainly be 
reflected in the demand for farm inputs, including labor. After controlling for education and 
other household demographics, recent attempts to separate these two major reasons for working 
off the farm include measures of farm size, cropping efficiency, and farm income variability in 
the equations to explain participation in off-farm jobs (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; and Goodwin 
and Holt, 2002).
21   
 
Regardless of the new directions for farm policy, the effects of program payments on 
farm-level risk and production decisions must still be understood. Using aggregate data, Mullen 
(2001) has found recently that risk reduction from de-coupled farm payments would also lead to 
output expansion through the wealth effect for farmers exhibiting decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. Her thesis also contains a good discussion of how risk, resource constraints, and special 
labor skills might interact with farm payments to affect labor allocation between farm and off-
farm activities. Had Mullen been able to take a holistic view of the farm household using micro 
data, her results could have been more precise and have provided a range in response levels. It is 
only through access to these micro data that we can uncover any changes in behavior that spill 
over into farming operation from additions to non-farm income and assets. The effects could be 
not only in terms of the level of production but also encourage some farmers to be among the 
first adopters of new, but as yet unproven farm technology.  
 
  To resolve these issues and the ones implicit in the several paragraphs above, we 
certainly need data for the farm business and the farm household, but additionally we may need 
the data for a panel of households (e.g. data for the same farm households over a series of years). 
Otherwise, there is no way to track production, price, or income variability.
22 Such panel data 
offer other advantages in tracing the demographic changes in the household that may affect a 
household’s response to policy initiatives.
23  
                                                 
21 While we can learn a great deal from these analyses, their applicability for national level policy evaluation can be 
rather limited. Studies of this kind generally rely on data from a special study or are possible only by matching data 
from different sources. For example, Mishra and Goodwin match data from a 1992 survey of Kansas farm 
households with farm records from the Kansas Farm Management Association. Because of the need to measure farm 
income variability, farms were excluded from the analysis if they did not have income records for at least eight of 
the past 10 years. Goodwin and Holt, on the other hand, were not able to include farm income in their off-farm labor 
equations because their two sources of data were inconsistent. Some of these limitations will go away as we 
continue to collect yearly farm household data on a consistent basis.   
22 Even with panel data the access to data on prices and price variability will remain problematic because it is 
common to collect data on input and output quantities, along with data on sales and expenditures. In ARMS, for 
example, providing price data is optional. Unit values can still be calculated by dividing revenues and expenses by 
quantities, but their interpretation as prices for across-farm comparisons remains problematic because of differences 
in quality, marketing costs, etc. Deaton (1997, pp. 271-315) discusses similar issues in the context of household 
consumption surveys.  By relying on price data from other sources, one may be able to capture yearly or regional 
price variation, but any across-farm price variability within a region would be blurred.  
23 Many of you at the conference are more familiar than I am with the difficulties in the design and maintenance of a 
longitudinal data base; the call for such a data set has certainly been heard before. It will be echoed again both 
because of it value in informing many policy debates, but also because economists now have a deeper understanding 
of the econometrics of panel data.  
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But the need for data doesn’t end here if we are indeed serious about policy provisions 
that are to recognize the multifunctional character of agriculture. It is perhaps easiest to illustrate 
by discussing environmental quality, because regulating non-point source pollution remains one 
of the most difficult challenges in agricultural policy.   
 
Recent studies have produced several policy schemes with theoretical appeal, but no 
single proposal has emerged as the clear answer to the non-point problem in practice. Pollution is 
not easily observable and depends on many site-specific factors that vary spatially, implying that 
the socially efficient policy is potentially different for each farm. Policy design is further 
complicated by the unavoidable production risk and the uncertainty about the relationship 
between environmental residuals and farm inputs and production inputs and outputs due to 
weather variability, etc. Environmental provisions of farm legislation are increasingly taking the 
shape of incentives to affect input use or adopt certain production or land use practices. The 
relationship between incentive policies, production risk, and input or other management 
decisions is complex (Ramaswami, 1992). A change in the price of a polluting input, for 
example, has an ambiguous effect on its use. The policy response cannot be predicted without 
knowledge of risk preferences as well as whether the input is risk increasing or decreasing, 
depending in part on the nature of the soil resource (Leathers and Quiggin, 1991; and Peterson 
and Boisvert, 2001). The same ambiguity would likely apply to predicting which farmers would 
respond to incentives to adopt environmentally friendly management practices or agree to put 
their land into conservation practices.   
 
To assess environmental provisions of farm legislation, we need data sufficient to 
estimate differences in the productivity and environmental vulnerability of land in farms for 
much the same reason that we need data on the heterogeneity of farm households and firms to 
assess the economic well being of the farm sector. These data are not only critical to 
understanding participation in environmental programs,
24 but also are an integral component in 
measuring the contribution of participants to the various dimensions of environmental quality.
25 
Only then is it possible to target programs regionally or locally to ensure program effectiveness 
(Jaroszewski, 2000).  
 
With these data in the hands of program administrators, the added costs of environmental 
program design and administration due to asymmetric information about the quality of soils or 
other natural resources might be substantially reduced. Rather than having to design programs 
that meet incentive compatibility restrictions so that the appropriate program is self-selected by 
local farmers to match particular resource situations, programs could be tailored to local 
conditions. The costs of asymmetric information have been shown to be substantial in even 
rather simple programs offering incentives for reduction in fertilizer applications to lower nitrate 
residuals (Peterson and Boisvert, 2001). 
 
                                                 
24 Participation in these programs is clearly one of the choices in farm households’ portfolio of livelihood strategies 
along with farming activities and off-farm jobs. Thus, it is not surprising that models of participation include 
variables accounting for income from all sources if the data are available (e.g. Purvis et al., 1989). 
25 More extensive data on fertilizer, pesticide, and other chemical use may be helpful in this regard as well.  
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continuing advances in GIS technology, extensive soils maps, data from the National Resources 
Inventory (NRI), and data bases of soil characteristics (e.g. Soils 5 data), the task of assembling 
data on the nature of the land resources controlled by farms in the ARMS sample would seem 
feasible.
26 Given the expense, there is a case to be made for directing attention initially to “hot” 
spots where significant environmental problems have been identified, and the intensity of effort 
to collect agricultural data for the purpose of studying environmental problems may vary by 
region and locality. But, no regions and localities should be overlooked entirely. It is exactly the 
lack of similar data on soils and other natural resources to match with farm costs and returns data 
that has heretofore also limited our ability to study resource productivity and the adoption of 
technology at the farm level.  
 
It is essential to understand that it is not sufficient to assemble these data without also 
advancing our analytical capacity to estimate the contribution of natural resources to agricultural 
productivity, or measure the environmental consequences of agricultural production (e.g. soil 
erosion, chemical and nutrient runoff and leaching, and air quality). Despite substantial progress 
to date, there is still need for methodological and modeling innovations involving enhanced 
collaboration among the biological, physical, and social scientists a la Antle and Wagenet 
(1995).
27   
 
Data on the Social Value of Agriculture’s Multifunctional Non-Commodity Outputs 
  The main purpose of this conference is to articulate the need for individual farm and farm 
household data to inform the debate over new directions in farm policy. And, up to this point, the 
discussion has been focused toward that end. A point of departure for the discussion, however, is 
the presumption that new policy initiatives will elevate to a place of prominence the social values 
and costs stemming from the several important non-commodity outputs of a multifunctional 
agriculture. Before making some final observations, therefore, it would seem appropriate to 
comment briefly on the role these values play in policy evaluation and how they can be obtained. 
 
  In the farm-household framework in Figure 3, these non-commodity outputs are valued 
both by society and by the farm households, but how the value of these non-market outputs is 
perceived is likely to be quite different between the two groups. The perceptions of value by the 
farm household is likely to affect farm and household decisions directly, whereas the societal 
                                                 
26 In some states such as New York, it is already necessary for farmers to have their fields outlined on soils maps so 
that the area by soil type can be delineated for the administration of the agricultural use-value assessment program. 
Soils types are combined into several productivity groups; these groups form the basis on which the size of the 
agricultural use-value property tax exemption is calculated.  
27 For example, Boisvert et al. (1997) discuss the difficulties in incorporating bio-physical simulation models of 
leaching and runoff for individual soils into economic models. Based on the output from these simulation models, 
they estimate a recursive set of equations that relate nitrogen runoff and leaching to weather, detailed soil 
characteristics, and farm practices and input levels. This is a “middle ground” strategy for estimating nitrate 
residuals. The equations are a procedure based on the simulation output from the bio-physical models that can be 
used to provide quantitative estimates of the distribution of runoff and leaching for a range of soils without the need 
for repeated runs of the simulation model for each economic application. By applying these estimated equations to 
field-level soils information for a sample of New York dairy farms, it was possible to evaluate the effects of 
different policies on the distribution of these nitrate residuals (Boisvert et al., 1997; and Peterson and Boisvert, 1998, 
2001).   
  17values will only affect decisions if farmers are remunerated or penalized appropriately to move 
toward socially optimal levels of their production. 
 
  Efforts to estimate how farmers value these non-commodity outputs date to the hedonic 
pricing studies that value attributes of land related to soil erosion.
28 More recently, there have 
been some efforts to understand how the potential health consequences, cost of cleanup, and 
potential legal liability from nutrient and chemical contamination might be reflected in land 
prices or in farmers input purchase decisions. Using reduced form equations derived from a farm 
household production model, Beach and Carlson (1993) find that the value farmers place on 
water quality and their concern for safety are both reflected in their willingness to pay for or use 
pesticides differing in toxicity. Using farm and field level data, Boisvert et al. (1997) also 
estimated a reduced form household production model to discover that land prices were reduced 
when the environmental vulnerability of the soils reached a relatively high level.  
 
  The broader question from a policy perspective is finding the value society places on 
these non-commodity outputs such as amenities and the several dimensions of environmental 
quality. These values are needed to set the levels of incentives or penalties appropriately to move 
us closer to the social optimum. In cases such as the conservation programs, enrollment is best 
conditioned on the combined contribution of the land (and the particular conservation practice 
being established) to overall environmental quality. These non-market values could also be used 
to give weights to the several components of an Index of Environmental Benefits on which this 
combined contribution could be assessed.    
     
  Research into valuation of non-market goods is largely the domain of environmental 
economists. Fortunately, many early environmental economists have their academic roots in 
agricultural and resource economics. A legacy for quality data and rigorous quantitative analysis 
born out of these roots has clearly been passed on to the new generations of environmental 
economists. In this sense, we can be optimistic about continued progress to discovering societal 
values for these non-commodity outputs.  
 
 
                                                
Much of the valuation work is based on contingent valuation method (CVM), discrete 
choice modeling, and more recently on experimental economics. In their now landmark book on 
the subject, Mitchell and Carson (1989) document the contingent valuation method and its 
numerous applications, as of that date, to valuing a diverse range of public goods. Refinements in 
CVM and related methods continue, as do the applications. But, as has often been the case in the 
study of agricultural economics problems, empirical CVM results are often based on data 
generated from special, small-scale studies at the local or regional levels. By the nature of the 
method, the goods valued are defined quite specifically and narrowly. For these reasons, it is 
often difficult to find values directly applicable for national policy analysis. For example, in an 
illustration of policy to promote environmental amenities and penalize pesticide and nitrate 
damage, Peterson et al. (1999), based their marginal social value of landscape amenities on 
various estimates from the literature as summarized by Poe (1999). Their pollution function was 
 
28 See Boisvert et al., 1997, for a selected list of these studies.      
 
  18calibrated from pesticide and nitrate damages estimates derived from Poe (1998); Schultz and 
Lindsay (1990); Powell (1990); and Pimentel et al. (1992).
29  
 
The extent to which these non-market values elicited from respondents at certain 
locations can be applied elsewhere is the subject of substantial debate in the environmental 
economics literature. The issue is referred to as benefits transfer--the validity of the application 
of a data set that was developed for one particular use to a quite distinct application (Brookshire 
and Neill, 1992). In her review of the literature, Jaroszewski (2000) makes it clear that the 
environmental economists are not of a single mind on this issue, but progress continues.   
  
Some Final Observations 
  Since the early years of farm commodity policy formation and before, agricultural 
economists, other agricultural scientists, and policy makers have relied on quality data to identify 
problems and point to policy solutions. As a new research agenda began to emerge in the mid-
1970’s to address the policy issues of an agricultural industry forever changed through the 
adoption of technology, and the expansion of international markets, it was clear that our 
agricultural data systems had to evolve as well. We have always known that the data 
requirements for effective agricultural policy analysis can be altered dramatically by changes in: 
the organization of farms, off-farm job opportunities, and the agenda of farm policy.  
 
I began this paper with the premise that there are currently two driving forces affecting 
agricultural policy economists’ demand for micro-level data about the farm business, its soils and 
other natural resource endowments, and the farm household. The first has been with us for some 
time, and it relates to the increasing heterogeneity of the agricultural sector—reflected in the 
sharper distinction between large commercial farms and a topology of small family farms 
including those with limited resources as well as those whose primary occupation is agriculture. 
For these latter groups in particular, the interrelationships between the farm and the household 
have grown increasingly complex, with off-farm income contributing a much larger share of total 
family income. The second force is the effort to re-focus agricultural policy on explicit 
recognition of the social values or costs of important non-commodity outputs from a 
multifunctional agriculture, while at the same time maintaining a balance with the longer 
standing concern for living standards of the agricultural community.   
 
As this new policy agenda unfolds some of its effects on the well being of farm 
households will be revealed in national income accounts; the effects of the provision of these 
important non-commodity outputs will be reflected in economy-wide indicators of natural 
resource use, etc. But these aggregate data will reveal almost nothing about the processes by 
which these changes come about or about the effectiveness of various policy initiatives.  
 
Historically, we have always relied on micro-level results to understand these processes 
by which policy change is effected. We must continue to do so. Because of the increased 
                                                 
29 Peterson et al. (1999) caution that if land is subsidized and the polluting input is taxed, an optimal subsidy on 
agricultural land does not equal the net value of land amenities.  Thus, results from non-market valuation surveys or 
other techniques to elicit amenity values may not be appropriate for setting the farmland subsidy, even if the values 
are “corrected” to account for the value of pollution generated per acre. 
 
  19complexity of the farm firm and farm household interactions, there is compelling need to gather 
information not only on the production of agricultural products by the farm business, but also on 
the other forms of activity by the farm household. It is only then that we can know how the total 
resources of the household are organized to provide a sufficient level of income and the extent to 
which some households make an explicit trade-off between income and the pursuit of a rural 
lifestyle.          
   
With agriculture as a major user of land and other natural resources, the recognition of 
agriculture as a multifunctional industry underscores explicitly its critical role in the supply of 
highly valued non-commodity outputs. By elevating these policy issues to a place of prominence, 
farmers, as part of a broader class of land and natural resource managers, would be remunerated 
for their contributions to the range of positive non-commodity outputs or penalized for negative 
outputs. Here, again, it is only through micro-level analysis within a holistic farm-household 
framework that we can determine how these programs might be combined with other resources 
to affect the well being of farm households. To be effective in moving us closer to the socially 
optimal levels of these non-commodity outputs, these policies must bring into much sharper 
focus the spatial diversity of various non-commodity outputs, be they site-specific, local, area-
specific, regional, or nationally differentiated. This will require augmenting the farm and farm 
household data with farm-level information regarding the quality of soils and other natural 
resources. 
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Table 1. Categories of Data in the United States’ Agricultural and 
Rural Economics Data System 















Marketing Bill Data 
Related Statistical 















Farm Income and 
Expenses 
Enterprise Budgets 
Costs and Returns 
Series 
Ag. Sectors of I-O 
Model 




Data on Farm 
Related Businesses 
(e.g. Census of 
Business and 
Manufacturers data 












Resources and Costs 
Finance 
Credit Institutions 












and Related Data 
Index of Supply and 
Utilization 










Source: Upchurch (1977). 
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Table 2. Major Categories of Data in the 2001 Agricultural Resource  
Management Study (ARMS) 





























Land in Farm/Ranch 
     Acres Operated 
     Conservation Acres 
     Rent Received 
     Rent Paid 
      Type of Farm 
Acreage and Production 
      By Crop 
Livestock 
     Livestock and Poultry  
         by Type 
Commodity Marketing 
and Income 
     Marketing Contracts 
     Production Contracts 
     Cash/Open Market 
        Sales-Crops 
     Cash/Open Market 
        Sales-Livestock 
Other Farm Income 
     Government Payments,    
          by Type,  
          Environmental,  
          Deficiency, 
         Disaster, Transition,  
          etc. 
     Custom Work 
     Forest Products 
     Sale of Machinery, etc. 
Operating and Capital 
Expenditures 
     Operating Expenses,   
         Includes Hired Labor 
      Cost of Capital  


























    Operator 
     Spouse 
     Unpaid Family 
Farm Assets 
     Land 
     Building 
      Machinery 
      Inventory, etc. 
Farm Debt 
     Seasonal Production  
        Loans 
      Loans from Banks, 
         Co-ops, Individuals, 
          Govt.  
Farm Operator 
      Demographics of  
           Operator, Spouse, 
            and Household   
      Anticipated 
            Changes in Farm 
      Business and Man- 
             agement Practices 
Farm Household 
       Off-farm Work by 
          Household Members 
        Type of Work and 
           Reasons 
         Benefits from Off- 
            farm Work 
         Non-farm Assets 
          Living Expenses 
          Changes in House- 
              hold Income       
Source: 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Study Phase III, NASS, 
USDA. 
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Table 3. An Example SAM
AGR Man Ser Lab1 Lab2 Cap Land URBAN RFARM RNFARM Low High Govt ROW Total
AGR 3,602     5,052     2,247     -          -           -          -             -            -          -             133         92           5,844      14,405  31,375     
Man 5,608     7,510     3,126     -          -           -          -             -            -          -             4,353      3,296      3,783      13,334  41,008     
Ser 5,968     3,951     9,437     -          -           -          -             -            -          -             11,038    9,057      4,131      11,466  55,047     
Lab1 1,646    2,032    13,663  -          -           -          -             -            -          -             -          -          -          106        17,446     
Lab2 3,789    2,634    2,806    -          -           -          -             -            -          -             -          -          -          56          9,286       
Cap 6,192    1,299    8,401    -          -           -          -             -            -          -             -          -          -          -        15,892     
Land 322       -       -       -          -           -          -             -            -          -             -          -          -          -        322          
URBAN -        -        -        10,690    5,376       4,497       31              -            -          -             -          -          -          -        20,593     
RFARM -        -        -        41           105          95            240            -            -          -             -          -          -          -        481          
RNFARM -        -        -        4,825      2,799       1,909       -             -            -          -             -          -          -          -        9,534       
Low -        -        -        -          -           -          -             7,603        208         3,433         474         1,700      4,199      -        17,617     
High -        -        -        -          -           -          -             12,990      273         6,102         -          -          1,010      -        20,374     
Govt 1,644     451        2,509     1,890      1,006      9,391      52              -            -          -             1,620      6,229      1,608      -        26,399     
ROW 2,604     18,081  12,859  -          -           -          -             -            -          -             -          -          5,823      -        39,366     
31,374  41,008  55,047   17,446    9,286       15,892     322            20,593     481        9,534        17,617    20,374    26,399    39,366  304,739   
42,946   42,946     30,608    37,991   
12,339    7,383     
Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Returns to Value Added
Lab1 Lab2 Cap Land URBAN RFARM RNFARM
URBAN 61 58 28 9
RFARM 0 1 1 75
RNFARM 28 30 12 0
Low 37 43 36
High 63 57 64
Govt. 11 11 59 16
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Exhibit 1. A 1950’s View of the Interaction between the Farm and the Household 
 
1. “In no other industry is the interdependence between the household and the firm so strong as 
in agriculture” (p. 417). 
 
2. “Not only are the firm and household intertwined in terms of physical location and economic 
decisions, but the supply of labor to the firm is provided partly through the particular household” 
(p. 417-8). 
 
3. “Production and profits are,…,only intermediate ends of farming.” “…[T]hey represent means 
to more ultimate ends rooted in consumption and utility” (p. 418).  
 
4. “The selection of production processes which allow an income flow consistent with the need 
for cash withdrawals to be used in consumption stands at a level with pure profit maximization in 
determining the manner in which resources can be used” (p. 418). 
 
5. “The firm-household complex is important not only in defining the organization of resources 
and family activities which will maximize utility at a given point in time, but also in helping 
explain uncertainty precautions, capital accumulation, soil conservation, and other production-
consumption decisions which relate to time” (p. 418). 
 
6. “A ‘pure type’ of firm-household interrelationship is that of subsistence farming, in which the 
family neither sells nor buys products in the market” (p. 419). 
 
7. “The firm and the household come into conflict particularly over the portions of the income 
flow to be allocated between (a) current consumption or (b) re-investment in the business as a 
basis for later income and consumption” (p. 423). 
 
8. “The important elements of firm-household relationships spring from time, uncertainty, and 
capital limitations. If it were not for the time-uncertainty complex,…, capital limitations would 
not arise and the firm-household interaction would be unimportant. Both units would have 
unlimited funds and either could be treated as an economic entity apart from the other” (p. 423). 
 
 
Source: Heady (1952). 
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Govt.










Figure 1. A Farm-Household Model: The Subsistence Farm Perspective
Farm Assets
Inter. Inputs  30
Govt.
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Table 5. List of Farmers’ Risk Management Options  
 
Enterprise Diversification 
Protective Production Practices 
Vertical Integration 
Production and Marketing Contracts 
Hedging and Option Contracts 
Financial Reserve Maintenance 
Leverage and Liquidity Management 
 
Lender Relationships 




Government Program Utilization 
Source: Barry (1999). 
 
 